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In this paper we explore what assemblage thinking offers social-spatial theory by 
asking what questions or problems assemblage responds to or opens up. Used 
variously as a concept, ethos and descriptor, assemblage thinking can be placed 
within the context of the recent ‘relational turn’ in human geography. In this 
context, we argue that assemblage thinking offers four things to contemporary 
social-spatial theory that, when taken together, provide an alternative response 
to the problematic of ‘relational’ thought; an experimental realism orientated to 
processes of composition; a theorisation of world of relations and that which 
exceeds a present set of relations; a rethinking of agency in distributed terms and 
causality in non-linear, immanent, terms; and an orientation to the expressive 
capacity of assembled orders as they are stabilised and change. In conclusion, we 
reflect on some further questions of politics and ethics that follow from our 
account of the difference assemblage thinking makes to relational thought.  
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Recent years have witnessed a remarkable proliferation in social scientists’ 
use of the term assemblage, as one part of a broader ‘relational turn’. Within 
human geography alone, the term has been variously used as a broad descriptor 
of different historical relations coming together (e.g. Cowan and Smith, 2009, on 
the ‘geopolitical social’); as an ethos oriented to the ‘instability’ of interactions, 
and the concomitant potential for novelty and spatiotemporal difference (e.g. 
Allen and Cochrane, 2010; McGuirk and Dowling, 2009); and as a concept for 
thinking the relations between stability and transformation in the production of 
the social (e.g. McFarlane, 2009; Swanton, 2008)1. Given the popularisation of 
assemblage in relation to a diverse range of substantive topics, issues and 
concerns, the phrase ‘assemblage geographies’ (Robbins and Marks, 2009) names 
the diverse energies gathered together across these and other uses (see Anderson 
                                                 
1  The relation between the French word agencement and assemblage in English is vexed.  There is 
no precise English translation of the French word agencement, and it is widely agreed that 
assemblage is not a good approximation (Law, 2004; Phillips, 2006).  For example, Phillips (2006: 
108) argues agencement implies arrangement and connection, with the word connoting 
‘arrangement’, ‘fixing’ and ‘fitting’.  He continues, suggesting that ‘the English word assemblage 
means much the same as assemblage in French – connoting blending, collating, gathering and 
joining’, and in French it is usually associated with more technical vocabularies (ibid: 109).  
Elsewhere, Callon and Caliskan (2005) have suggested that agencement is a deliberate wordplay 
on agencer (meaning to arrange or fit together) and agence (meaning agency). This play on words 
is significant, opening up productive ways of thinking about matter and distributed notions of 




and McFarlane, 2011). Alongside the ever expanding range of assemblage 
geographies, new forms of spatial politics are beginning to emerge, including 
opening up the political potential of becoming (e.g. Ruddick, 2010, on 
‘emancipatory assemblages’), experimenting with new relations with life 
(Hinchliffe, 2007), and tracing the specific associations through which forms of 
power endure (e.g. McCann and Ward (2011) on policy mobilities).   
The paper’s purpose, then, is a straightforward one: to step back from the 
increasing use of assemblage within geographical debates and to attempt to take 
stock of what assemblage thinking offers social-spatial theory. By focusing on the 
problem space opened up by assemblage as agencement, we argue that what is 
novel about assemblage is the claim that ‘relations are exterior’ to their terms. As 
such, we show that assemblage thinking is a distinct response to a series of 
emerging tensions and problems in ‘relational’ thought: the set of partially 
connected theories that claim that entities acquire their form, efficacy and 
meaning by virtue of their position within some form of relational configuration. 
This point is now a familiar one. Indeed to argue or assert that an entity, indeed 
any entity, is relational, and/or is emergent from relations and/or take place in 
relations is perhaps the starting point and sometimes even the main claim of 
contemporary social-spatial theory (Harrison, 2007; Lee and Brown, 1994). For us 
the risk is that it may become too familiar. Rather than a provocation that forces 
us to think again, relational thought risks becoming a routine to be mastered and 
repeated. The danger is that in offering a ‘relational’ account of the social, it is 
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easy to stop short of a set of subsequent questions: How might we attend to the 
plurality of relations that might differ in both nature and kind? Are relations 
internal or external to their terms? Can relations change without the terms also 
changing? Are actual entities exhausted by their position within relations? How 
can we understand what we could term ‘events’ that may break, interrupt or 
change relations, and may initiate the chance of new relations? (Anderson and 
Harrison, 2010: 15).  
It is in relation to these and other questions about the status of ‘relations’ 
that we think assemblage thinking offers something unique and of significance. 
By beginning from the claim that ‘relations are exterior to their terms’, 
assemblage thinking allows us to foreground on-going processes of composition 
across and through different human and non-human actants; rethink social 
formations as complex wholes composed through a diversity of parts that do not 
necessarily cohere into seamless organic wholes; and attend to the expressive 
powers of entities (Bennett, 2005; Gidwani, 2008; Latour, 2005; Ong, 2007). More 
specifically, in our own research we have engaged with assemblage as a word, 
concept, and ethos to think through three conceptual problems inherent in the 
now commonplace claim that the social is ‘relationally constituted’2.  
First, how to avoid the naturalization of one or more socio-spatial forms or 
socio-spatial processes given the diverse types of space that have now been 
                                                 
2 Our research spans domains as different as science and technology, informality and 




disclosed by relational work – territories, fluids, networks, foams and other 
spheres, flows, regions, rhizomes, fluids, scales and so on? As four geographers 
working in different substantive areas, part of our attraction to assemblage 
thinking is that it does not point to any particular spatial imaginary. An 
assemblage approach demands an empirical focus on how these spatial forms 
and processes are themselves assembled, are held in place, and work in different 
ways to open up or close down possibilities. In short, assemblage provides a 
useful purchase on processes of composition, allowing us to understand how 
spatial forms and processes are held together, often with degrees of internal 
tension, and might have been assembled otherwise.  
Second, how do we reconcile the systematicity of certain orders on the one 
hand, and change and emergence of new orderings on the other?  We have tried 
to use assemblage in our own work to address this problem. For example, we 
might think here of how infrastructure in many cities is subject to economies of 
repair, maintenance, disruption, and breakdown, necessitating complex inter-
relations of expertise, learning, capital (dis)investment, policy and regulatory 
frames, and material reconfiguration. Assemblage thinking allows us to attend to 
how these often disparate activities become entangled with one another, but 
nonetheless have potential agency beyond those interactions which may later 
become parts in other assemblages. To give another example: we could think 
here of how a form of anticipatory action such as pre-emption in U.S.A 
counterterrorism policy is constituted through the redeployment of elements 
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from other ways of acting over futures as well as the intensification of dormant 
tendencies in linked areas of public policy. Pre-emption emerges as a coherent 
and distinct way of reordering space, even as it is always involved in a series of 
partial connections with other ways of acting over threats and hazards. What 
assemblage offers, then, is a sustained account of the different ways in which 
orders endure across differences and amid transformations, in addition to a 
sensitivity to how orders change and are reworked. 
Third, and following this, how do particular sets of relations appear to 
hold together across multiple differences and contradictions, even in what 
appears to be incoherent relations? For example, we might consider how 
assemblage can re-orientate understandings of race by focusing analysis on 
iterative performances of social differentiation in moments of encounter.  This 
focus enables us to view race as simultaneously fluid and fixing; assemblage 
allows for the different and oftentimes contradictory ways in which race comes 
to matter without denying the tendency for race to fall back into relatively stable 
forms and relations (Saldanha, 2006). While maintaining a conception of the 
relational and embodied investment in differentiation, for Saldanha, Swanton 
(2010) and others assemblage helps understand how the category of race is, at 
least for a time, stabilized as a provisional formation composed of a diversity of 
human and non-human parts that act together.   
These three problems and some of their associated questions emerge as 
puzzles in the paper as we work through how assemblage has been deployed 
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variously as a word to describe one way amongst others in which orders cohere, a 
concept that directs attention to processes of agencement, and an ethos sensitive to 
difference, heterogeneity and indeterminacy. Our aim, then, is to explore the 
problem-space that surrounds the term rather than critique other uses or 
advocate some form of unified theory of social-spatial processes and forms.  
We develop our approach over four sections. In section one we consider 
different uses of assemblage as word, concept, and ethos in order to draw out 
what we see as the promise of thinking with assemblages: an openness about 
spatial form that follows from an experimental stance that is attentive to how 
provisional orderings cohere in the midst of and through ontologically diverse 
actants. Accordingly, we also question the ways in which concern with active 
processes of formation has in some, but not all, uses of assemblage been 
substituted by an identification of particular kinds of assembled forms. Our 
concern here is that the term assemblage is used simply to designate a new form 
of socio-spatial organisation in a way that drains this terminology of its dynamic 
potential and its attentiveness to the often uneven and uncomfortable practices of 
composition. Section two, explores the ‘exteriority of relations’ and details the 
ways in which assemblage theory differs from other forms of relational thinking, 
notably some versions of actor-network theory. In section three we examine how 
this emphasis on the exteriority of relations invites a re-thinking of distributions 
of agency and, in particular, the issue of causation. Section four develops the 
emphasis on non-linear causality in section three by taking up the problem of 
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how assemblages endure as real entities and how they transform. We conclude 
by reflecting on further questions about ethics and politics that follow from our 
account and summarise the difference thinking the ‘exteriority of relations’ 
makes to relational thought. By finishing with these questions, we hope 
assemblage remains a term that forces, invites or enables thought – rather than 
becoming a routine, a set of procedures and protocols, to be mastered and 
repeated. In his translator’s foreword to Deleuze and Guattari’s A Thousand 
Plateaus Brian Massumi (1988: xiii) writes: “A concept is a brick. It can be use to 
build the courthouse of reason. Or it can be thrown through the window”. 
Massumi’s argument is that a “concept has no subject or object other than itself”  
(ibid). Rather, concepts are acts. It is in this spirit that we think with assemblage.  
 
Composition and an ethos of experimentation 
 
In this section we examine how assemblage provides a distinct way of 
conceptualising the relations between entities and their constituent elements.  
Though the primary focus of this section is on conceptual uses of the term 
assemblage, we begin by reviewing the range of meanings that this terminology 
has in different traditions. We do so in order to highlight a tension in assemblage 
thinking: between treating assemblage as a distinct form and treating assemblage 
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as an ongoing process of agencement through which form emerges and may 
endure.  
   Assemblage terminology traverses, and draws insight from a range of 
disciplines, including archaeology, geology, ecology, and art (see Phillips, 2006; 
Venn, 2006). In these contexts the term assemblage provides a conceptual 
repertoire for classification and categorization. In archaeology, the term is used, 
in the main, to refer to a group of different artefacts found in association with 
one another at a particular site. In ecology, there is a similar use. Assemblage 
refers to a taxonomic subset of a community; where a community is a collection 
of species occurring in a specified time and place. Assemblage, specifically, 
names the phylogenetically related members of a community (for example, all 
mammalian species in a given place at a given time). In art theory, we find a 
slightly different use. Assemblage has become synonymous with pastiche, 
montage, and collage. But when first used by Jean Dubuffet in 1953, it referred to 
a 3D sculpture consisting of found objects arranged to create a piece.  
Assemblage operates as a technical term that enables heterogeneous 
phenomena to be classified and ordered. In relation to ecology, art, and 
archaeology the form of association is already-always delimited. An order is 
provided by taxonomic criteria, by the unity of a piece or work, or by the space 
of a site. In each case the term continually blurs into other similar terms. 
Assemblage blurs with ensemble, community and guild in ecology and with 
montage, pastiche and collage in art, for example. But in each of these technical 
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usages, assemblage is deployed as a tool of classification that delimits some form 
of grouping from another grouping.  
Of course, there is something of a leap from these diverse deployments of 
the term to its more recent articulation in contemporary social-spatial theory. 
Nevertheless, it does remind us of a risk implicit in using terms such as 
assemblage, and other linked terms such as network, to name relational 
configurations; that form replaces formation, assemblage as noun replaces 
assemblage as verb. For the most part, such a use relies on taken-for-granted 
dictionary definitions of the term (see Sassen, 2006). It loses sight of what we take 
to be the key starting point of an assemblage based analysis of the social: to 
understand assembling as an ongoing process of forming and sustaining 
associations between diverse constituents. Two brief examples help illustrate 
what such an approach offers by showing how assemblage has been utilised to 
describe formations composed of different kinds of entities or processes. What is 
emphasised in an assemblage based analysis is the heterogeneity of their 
component elements and the specific ‘style of structuration’ (Bennett, 2010)  
through which seemingly well ordered formations hold together.   
First, McGuirk and Dowling (2009: 176) use assemblage to challenge the 
tendency in critical urban studies and political geography to interpret (or ‘read 
down’) political-economic and social change in cities from abstract features of 
‘neoliberalism in general’. Focusing on contemporary residential developments 
(masterplanned residential estates) in Sydney, Australia they resist the tendency 
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to cast such developments as “iconic expressions of urban neoliberalisation” 
(ibid. 174) – and the inclination to mobilise neoliberalism as a pre-constituted 
theoretical explanation of urban phenomena’ (ibid. 178). McGuirk and Dowling 
(2009: 178) use assemblage to emphasise that master planned residential estates 
are social formations borne of ‘multiple projects and rationales’ that “are realised 
through diverse assemblages of institutions, actors and practices”. Assemblage 
enables McGuirk and Dowling to describe the provisionality of housing 
developments – in contrast to the singular story of neoliberal retreat – and how 
these developments are the ‘less than coherent’ outcomes of interacting practices, 
actors and institutions.   
Second, assemblage has been used to question how geographers 
understand race as a social formation and category of identity and difference 
(Saldanha, 2007; Swanton, 2010).  For example, Saldanha’s (2007) research on 
white ravers on a Goan beach seeks to challenge the conventional framing of race 
as a social construct. Saldanha (2007) couples the concept of assemblage with 
other concepts (face, embodiment, location, and viscosity) to account for the 
emergence of race on the ground in interaction. Rather than a social construct – 
where race is primarily understood as ideas and representations to be struggled 
over – Saldanha sees race as “a heterogeneous process of differentiation 
involving the materiality of bodies and spaces…shifting amalgamation of human 
bodies and their appearance, genetic material, artefacts, landscapes, music, 
money, language, and states of mind” (Saldanha, 2007: 9). Assemblage allows 
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Saldanha to describe the provisionality of race, emphasising how race takes form 
through the connections between heterogeneous components (bodies, things, 
practices, contexts…) in particular moments. Saldanha draws on assemblage to 
both account for the relative stability of race as a social formation (where order is 
a ‘shifting effect of many little connections and flows’) without negating the 
possibility that things might be otherwise; indeed his core argument is that anti-
racist politics should be concerned with proliferating race – with multiplying its 
meanings and affects – rather than eradicating race. 
In the examples of neoliberalism and race, assemblage terminology speaks 
of the processes of composition that produce durable orderings and of the ontic 
indeterminacy of what might ordinarily be thought of as totalising practices and 
processes. Notwithstanding differences in conceptual terminology, what the 
examples have in common is a particular ethos of engagement that accompanies 
thinking with assemblages: an ethos of engagement that attends to the messiness 
and complexity of phenomena; an ethos that is committed to process-based 
ontologies that challenge conventional explanations by focussing on materially 
diverse configurations; and an ethos that emphasises the open-ended, unfinished 
nature of social formations. Whilst not using the term ethos, Marcus and Saka 
(2006) characterise something similar when they argue that assemblage thinking 
brings together two seemingly contradictory ways of understanding social order: 
the ephemeral and the structural. The result, for Marcus and Saka (2006: 102), is 




Indeed, the term [assemblage] itself in its material referent invests 
easily in the image of structure, but is nonetheless elusive. The time-
space in which assemblage is imagined is inherently unstable and 
infused with movement and change…Whoever employs it does so 
with a certain tension, balancing, and tentativeness where the 
contradictions between the structural and the unstably heterogeneous 
create almost a nervous condition for analytical reason.  
 
Assemblage certainly holds within it a sense of composition and instability, 
indeed we explore this dynamic below, but we suggest that Marcus and Saka’s 
diagnosis overplays the ‘contradiction’ between the ‘structural’ and the ‘unstably 
heterogeneous’ by underplaying the extent to which assemblage works outside 
of a problematic of ‘structure’ (in particular if ‘structure’ is taken to be an 
extrinsic source of determination standing apart from, and determining, any 
actual occurrence). By attending to the ‘ontological priority’ (Massumi, 2002b) of 
processes of composition through which forms emerge (and may return), the 
term assemblage invites us to think outside of a distinction between the 
structured and the unstructured. Accordingly, we would phrase the condition 
that follows the use of assemblage somewhat differently: assemblage involves an 
‘experimental condition’ for a social-spatial theory concerned with formation.  
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Obviously, the term ‘experimental’ comes with its connotations. The 
classical notion of the experiment refers to a method for testing hypotheses 
under controlled conditions. This is the exact opposite of what we mean here. We 
invoke the verb ‘to experiment’ as an ethos for understanding the durability of 
orderings (or collections of orderings) by tracing the relations between the 
heterogeneous elements that compose them, following how an assemblages as a 
‘co-functioning’ itself may achieve effects and enter into relations with other 
assemblages, and mapping the encounters through which the elements within an 
assemblages are brought into contact with forces outside of them (see Anderson 
and Harrison, 2010; Bennett, 2005; McFarlane, 2011; Swanton, 2010; Saldanha, 
2007). It has two characteristics. First, it involves an intervention designed to 
describe but also to interrupt and recast relations through what Stengers (2008: 
109) calls “a practice of active, open, demanding attention ... to the experience as 
we experience it”. Second, it includes a resistance to closure and encourages a 
stress on open-endedness around the emergent and the already formed. An 
example of how thinking with assemblage embodies this ethos of engagement is 
Swanton’s (2010) montage of fragments to evoke everyday multiculture and 
performances of race.  Here the juxtaposition of narrative fragments emphasise 
the messy, contradictory and unfinished nature of race as it takes form in 
encounters.  In this sense the narrative style seeks to be more assemblage-like: it 
begins in the midst of things, and focuses on the taking form of race at particular 
moments. By focusing on composition, thinking with the concept of assemblage 
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enables an ethos of engagement with the world that is deliberately open as to the 
form of the unity, the types of relations involved, and how the parts will act.  
The exteriority of relations 
 
We can briefly compare the experimental orientation to processes of 
composition with other challenges to conventional forms of explanation that 
have followed the ‘relational turn’ to get a sense of its insight and significance. In 
particular, assemblage thinking enjoys some resonance with Jessop, Brenner and 
Jones’ (2008) notion of ‘sociospatial relationality’. For example, while they do not 
use the term assemblage, Jessop, Brenner and Jones’ (2008) attempt to recognize 
the polymorphic, multidimensional character of social-spatial relations is framed 
by a similar conceptual problem - the reduction of social-spatial relations to one 
form. They identify four dimensions of social-spatial relations – territory, place, 
scale and network – each of which has an associated principle of socio-spatial 
structuration and an associated pattern of socio-spatial relations. Rather than 
privileging one of these four dimensions, Jessop et al. seek to draw them together 
in an attempt to develop commensurable vocabularies that would enable 
researchers to explore the differential weighting and specific articulation of each 
dimension in a given ‘spatiotemporal context’ (ibid.: 393). In some ways Jessop et 
al.’s piece is close to certain uses of the term assemblage; both involve a 
commitment, of some form, to realism and both offer a vision of a world riven by 
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volatility. However, there is one critical difference between this model and 
assemblage. Jessop et al. reduce social-spatial relations to a set of already known, 
recognised and agreed upon patterns, principles and forms. There is only limited 
room for patterns, principles, or forms that differ from these four dimensions. At 
best new combinations of the four may emerge as elements from each are 
differentially articulated, but there can be nothing that is genuinely new (and no 
theoretical account is given of articulation). Moreover, the critical category – and 
the most undeveloped one – concerns the ‘spatiotemporal context’ within which 
elements from the four forms are somehow articulated together. It is here that we 
find the key distinction with thinking social-spatial relations through the term 
assemblage. Assemblage privileges process of formation and does not make a 
priori claims about the form of relational configurations or formations. With 
assemblage the starting point is ‘context’ and the conditions under which 
provisional unities emerge from the agencement of heterogeneous phenomena, 
not a neutral frame within which a set of ideal forms are somehow articulated. 
What assemblage promises, then, is a sustained account of the specific ways in 
which orders emerge and endure across differences and amid transformations.  
In discussion with Claire Parnet, Gilles Deleuze (Deleuze and Parnet, 1977) 
introduces a “vital protest against principles” (41), one that for us is at the heart 
of the difference assemblage makes to ‘thinking relationally’ and its promise as a 
concept for understanding durability and transformation in social orders. 
Deleuze’s central claim is that “relations are external to their terms” (ibid. 41) (on 
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which see DeLanda, 2010). We see ‘relations of exteriority’ as a defining 
characteristic of assemblage that re-orientates our approach to phenomena by 
insisting on the autonomy of component parts. The idea is a strange one. 
Beginning from the affirmation that ‘relations are external to their terms’ 
involves standing apart from two more common ways of thinking relations and 
terms (when the things related could include people, objects, organisations and 
anything else). The first posits relations as a second-order connection between 
atomistic individual mediated through some form of contact or exchange. The 
second is that individuals are fully determined by their relations, meaning that a 
change in relation, no matter how small, changes the things related. But Deleuze 
offers an alternative. What kind of world is disclosed if we presume that a thing 
is conditioned, but not determined, by its relations and that relations therefore 
have autonomy from the terms related? Deleuze continues: 
   
If one takes this exteriority of relations as a conducting wire or as a 
line, one sees a very strange world unfold, fragment by fragment: a 
Harlequin’s jacket or patchwork, made up of solid parts and voids, 
blocs and ruptures, attractions and divisions, nuances and 
bluntnesses, conjunctions and separations, alternations and 
interweavings, additions which never reach a total and subtractions 
whose remainder is never fixed.  




Later in his discussion with Parnet, Deleuze poses a deceptively simple question: 
What is an assemblage? Deleuze’s answer helps us attend to the ‘very strange 
world’ that follows from his affirmation of the exteriority of relations. For 
Deleuze, the term assemblage describes the ‘co-functioning’ of heterogeneous 
parts into some form of provisional, open, whole. This definition may not sound 
very precise, but this is, in many respects, the point. An assemblage is a 
‘harlequin’s jacket or patchwork’ of different bodies that can never be reduced to 
a series of constituent parts nor identified as an organic whole. An assemblage is 
finite: an emergent effect of processes of gathering and dispersion.  
What is an assemblage, then? Deleuze provides an outline of a definition in 
the following terms: 
 
It is a multiplicity which is made up of many heterogeneous terms and 
which establishes liaisons, relations between them across ages, sexes 
and reigns – different natures. Thus, the assemblage’s only unity is 
that of co-functioning: it is a symbiosis, a ‘sympathy’.  
(Deleuze and Parnet, 1977: 52)  
 
For Deleuze, the ‘unity’ of assemblages is not that of an organic whole, or a total 
system, where different parts are smoothly or violently subsumed into 
homogeneity. It can therefore be distinguished from models of socio-political 
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composition that draw on organisimic metaphors.  Broadly speaking organisimic 
models, current in systems theory, molecular biology and information theory, 
tend to reify a conception of the boundaries of the organism, be it social, 
biological or informational. In systems theory the organs of a social or biological 
system largely function to reinforce the boundaries of the organism. (Luhmann, 
1995; Maturana and Varela, 1972; Oyama, 2000). Alternatively, for Deleuze, while 
maintaining a conception of the internal dynamism of assemblages, he directs 
attention to how, as he puts it, “all the elements of a non-homogeneous set 
converge, making them function together” (Deleuze and Parnet, 1977: 39). For 
Deleuze, the emphasis is squarely on the bringing together of heterogeneous 
entities into some form of temporary relation (or set of relations), without 
presupposing that these relations necessarily constitute an organism. Thus, an 
assemblage is both the provisional holding together of a group of entities across 
differences and a continuous process of movement and transformation as 
relations and terms change. Deleuze’s use of terms with quite different 
genealogies - ‘symbiosis’ in the context of biological interactions and ‘sympathy’ 
in the context of the interpenetration of bodies that feel - to understand the 
‘unity’ of an assemblage is instructive here (see also ibid. 40). As Deleuze 
(Deleuze and Parnet, 1977: 52) puts it: “It is never filiations which are important, 
but alliances, alloys; these are not successions, lines of descent, but contagions, 
epidemics, the wind”. As such, Deleuze invites us to wonder about how 
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heterogeneous parts are assembled and orders hold together and endure both 
across differences and through differences.  
For Deleuze and Guattari the notion of exteriority is a way of resolving the 
relation between composition and difference. In developing this notion of 
exteriority Deleuze and Guattari draw on notions of compositionism developed 
originally in Italian Autonomist Marxist thinking in the 1960s and 70s (Wright, 
2002). Characterized as the ‘workerist movement’, or what become known as the 
operaismo, one of the central aims of Italian autonomist Marxist thought was to  
 
identify, within the larger Marxist tradition, a variety of movements, 
politics and thinkers who have emphasized the autonomous power of 
workers – autonomous from capital, from their official organizations 
(e.g. the trade unions, the political parties) and, indeed, the power of 
particular groups of workers to act autonomously from other groups  
(Cleaver quoted in Wright, 2008: 116, emphasis added).  
 
Accordingly, autonomist thinkers developed the notion of ‘class composition’ as 
a new expression of the organisation of class struggle that maintained the 
autonomy of both individuals and new revolutionary groupings. Whilst 
emerging from other genealogies, contemporary assemblage theory resonates 
with the practical problematic of the autonomists, seeking to develop an 
alternative conceptual repertoire to organisimic models of relationality which, 
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though based on a range of systems or network metaphors, conceptualise the 
functionality of parts as determined by heretical relations with an organic whole. 
To invoke the term assemblage is to orientate inquiry to how ‘open ended 
collectives’ (Bennett, 2010) are temporarily achieved in a world of differences, 
and how they may endure and may transform without the heterogeneous 
elements that compose them ever adding up to an organic whole.  
For this reason, we see close resonances between assemblage and some 
versions of actor network theory – after all, Latour (2005) has suggested that 
actor-network theory tells us nothing at all about the form of relations a priori to 
the work of tracing associations. In Latour’s (2005) attempt to recast actor-
network theory in terms of Tarde’s associationist sociology, the term network is 
orientated toward what Latour describes as ‘traceable connections’ whereby 
pockets of social order are precariously stabilised against “a much vaster 
backdrop of discontinuities” (ibid. 245). Both Latour’s actor-network theory and 
assemblage theory are framed by ambivalence toward the a-priori reduction of 
social-spatial relations to any fixed form or set of fixed forms – the micro and 
macro forms of reductionism introduced above. And both invite us to be open to 
how social-spatial relations are patterned and structured through what Bennett 
(2010: 23) refers to as “ad hoc groupings of diverse elements, of vibrant material 
of all sorts ... living, throbbing confederations that are able to function despite the 
persistent presence of energies that confound them from within”. Spatial forms – 
such as scales, regions, or territories – emerge from the ‘co-functioning’ of 
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heterogeneous materials (and various processes have been described in order to 
understand the emergence of the metric from the topological).  
Assemblages, like actor-networks, are provisional unities that may 
themselves have an ‘emergent’ or ‘complex’ causality that is irreducible to their 
component parts. Whilst it is fair to say that assemblage theory shares an initial 
orientation with Latour’s version of actor-network theory it would, we think, be 
a mistake to see assemblages as the proper ‘object’ for an ‘after’ actor-network 
theory literature (even though the terms assemblage and network are often used 
interchangeably). When deployed as a concept, rather than word or ethos, 
assemblage makes some original claims about relations and their terms. Rather 
than conceptualise assemblages as seamless wholes the notion of the ‘exteriority 
of relations’ 
 
implies a certain autonomy for the terms they relate, or as Deleuze 
puts it ‘a relation may change without the terms changing’.  Relations 
of exteriority also imply that the properties of the component parts 
can never explain the relations which constitute a whole, relations do 
not have as their causes the property of the [component parts] 
between which they are established…’ although they may be caused 
by the exercise on a component’s capacities.  




So what is at stake when we talk of assemblages defined by ‘relations of 
exteriority’? While other modes of thinking relationally view entities as 
syntheses, where ‘the linkages between its components form logically necessary 
relations which make the whole what it is’, assemblage theory views relations as 
contingently obligatory (DeLanda, 2006: 11). So, for example, via the labour of 
tracing associations actor-network theory seeks to relate humans and non-
humans in their co-production of the world. And in this work of relating the 
properties of parts – objects, artefacts, technical practices, humans, and so on – 
form logically necessary relations in the constitution of an actor-network. In 
DeLanda’s vocabulary the actor-network becomes a ‘seamless whole’ that fully 
assimilates its component parts; nothing stands outside the descriptions that 
actor-network theory performs (Hetherington and Law, 2000: 128; Lee and 
Brown, 1994). The problem is that seeing entities as fully determined by their 
present relations makes it difficult to understand the efficacy of ‘parts’ by 
making the relational configuration into a homogeneous whole.  
Latour (2005) hints to precisely the problem of how to think an ‘outside’ to 
relations. Alongside associations, he invokes the “strange figure of plasma” (ibid. 
50, n 48) a figure coined to stand for “that which is not yet formatted, not yet 
engaged in metrological chains and not yet covered, surveyed, mobilized, or 
subjectified” (ibid. 244). By invoking a vast ‘unformatted’ realm from which 
associations emerge Latour offers one figure of an outside to relations. By 
contrast, beginning from the ‘exteriority of relations’ avoids invoking a 
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distinction between formatted associations and a vast unformatted realm. For 
DeLanda (2006) relations are contingently obligatory: entities are affected by 
relations and by the other terms they are related to but they are not fully 
determined by those relations/terms (see also Harman, 2008). On the one hand, 
entities can be detached from any one assemblage to become parts of another 
assemblage. On the other, entities are never fully actualised within any of the 
relations that constitute an assemblage. Here a distinction between the properties 
and capacities of entities is critical, and this distinction underpins the attempt to 
understand the relations between parts and wholes in assemblages. Where the 
properties of a part are given and known (or knowable), capacities are open and 
unpredictable. Properties refer to actual, real, states of affairs. By contrast, 
capacities form an open-ended set of potentialities that cannot be deduced from 
properties since: “These capacities do depend on a component’s properties but 
cannot be reduced to them since they involve reference to the properties of other 
interacting entities” (Delanda, 2005: 11).  
Jane Bennett’s example of a 2003 blackout in North America where a 
cascade of events left 50 million people and 24,000km2 without electricity helps 
illustrate these arguments out the exteriority of relations and the importance of 
the capacities of a component element or part. Bennett argues that viewing the 
grid as a machine or tool – “as a series of fixed parts organised from without that 
serves an external purpose” (Bennett, 2010: 25) – cannot adequately explain the 
blackout.  Instead, the ordering of heterogeneous elements and flow of electricity 
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through the grid is an achievement – an emergent effect and one “that endures 
alongside energies and factions that fly out from it and disturb it from within” 
(Bennett, 2010: 24). The blackout illustrates the provisionality of the grid as a 
series of minor happenings (including routine generator withdrawals and a bush 
fire) radically transform the interactions between the component parts producing 
a dissonance that meant cooperation became impossible and the grid failed.  The 
point here is not that the properties of the component parts of the electric grid 
changed, but their capacities. As generators are unplugged from the assemblage 
and wire-tree encounters plugged in, the interactions between component parts 
and more specifically the capacities of diverse elements are transformed to the 
extent that the grid falls apart and a blackout temporarily takes place.   
Bennett’s example illustrates how capacities are two-sided potentials to 
affect other terms/relations and be affected by those other terms/relations. As 
such, all of an entity’s capacities cannot be definitively named and known in 
advance. All that can be known is how specific capacities play out in relation to, 
or with, the properties and capacities of other entities. On this understanding, the 
distinction between properties and capacities is a way of avoiding a holism, or 
totalization, which would see entities as fully determined by their relations. 
Thinking in terms of capacities opens up a moment of indetermination in the 
morphogenic processes that compose assemblages, as well as allowing for the 
autonomy and agency of component parts. Through this framing of relations as 
contingently obligatory, and by focussing on the exercise of capacities that are 
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unknowable outside particular confederations, we can allow for (without 
assimilating) the ‘co-functioning’ of differences within assemblages.   
Rethinking agency and causality 
 
What assemblage thinking allows for, then, is a world populated with a 
motley array of entities with differing properties and capacities: infrastructures, 
buildings, unicorns, ideas, circuit boards, tears, air, handgliders, hatred, all are 
capable of acting and making a difference (on materiality see Anderson and 
Wylie, 2009; Latham and McCormack, 2004; Kearnes, 2003; Colls, 2007). There is 
no reason why this realism goes ‘all the way up’ as well as ‘all the way down’ 
(Shaviro, 2010). For example, might we learn to think of ‘Society’, for example, 
not only as an abstraction to be explained by reference to the parts that compose 
it, but as a real entity with expressive powers that is more than the sum of its 
parts? Following on from the affirmation that ‘relations are external to their 
terms’, in this section we examine the difference that thinking with assemblages 
might make to how agency and causality are understood. If assemblage as a 
concept and an ethos involves a theory of society “that suggests all entities result 
from a swarm of tinier subcomponents that do not melt into a seamless whole” 
(Harman, 2008: 367), where does this leave agency and causality? How might we 
conceive of how the ‘elements’ or ‘parts’ of an assemblage function in processes 
of composition? How might rethinking causality and agency allow us to consider 
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the dynamic between the durability of assembled orders and their 
transformation? We argue that assemblage thinking entails a focus not just on 
how agency produces resultant forms, but on how the agency of both the 
assemblage and its parts can transform both the parts and the whole. The 
implication of assemblage thinking is that causality is located not in a pre-given 
sovereign agent, but in interactive processes of assembly through which 
causality operates as a nonlinear process. This involves a distinct orientation to 
agency and causality in three broad and inter-connected ways. 
First, as Graham Harman (2008: 367) indicates, the agency of assemblage 
must be understood through a ‘doctrine of emergence’. Assemblages are shaped 
as they are made (Hetherington and Law, 2000: 131). Here, the agents of 
transformation or stability may be singular or multiple, large or small, within or 
outwith the assemblage, and their operation may be sudden or gradual. 
Assemblages shifts our analytic gaze from end-products to agents in “the 
transient crystallizations of a longer process” (Harman, 2008: 373; Li, 2007). 
Assemblage operates not just as a concept aimed at understanding how a set of 
relations emerge and hold together across differences, but as an ethos for 
thinking the relations between durability and transformation. This ethos does 
not, of course, equate to an understanding of all entities as ever-changing and 
unstable, but to how durability is sustained or not. Durability in social forms can 
be achieved through sedimentation, repetition or habit. But durability in form 
should not be confused with fixity. An ethos of assemblage eschews thinking in 
30 
 
terms of essence or fixity by holding onto the possibility that entities are 
continuously being formed and deformed. It’s important here that in narrating 
processes of assembly, care is taken to attend to the forms of power through 
which particular relations are held stable, fall apart, are contested, and are 
reassembled. Otherwise there is a risk that non-transformation, failure, and 
obduracy may seem to slide from view (Harrison, 2007). Particular forms of 
transformation are often more likely than others. This is not to posit power as 
external to the assemblage, although the power of other assemblages to act upon 
one another is of course important, but to locate power as a contingent and 
multiple force in relation to which assemblages are made and remade.  
Second, if assemblage focuses attention on the gathering together of 
entities, the concern with the exteriority of relations means that assemblage 
thinking is simultaneously concerned with the agency of component parts. What 
the rethinking of agency provides is a way of describing how different agents 
within the assemblage may possess different resources and capacities to act. We 
can illustrate this by contrasting the conception of agency in Karen Barad’s work 
on ‘phenomena’ and Jane Bennett’s work on the agency of assemblages. What 
Barad (2007) calls ‘agential realism’ is closely related to but not equivalent to 
what Bennett (2010) calls ‘vibrant matter’ – the recognition that agency lies in 
distributed processes of intra-active becoming, where materiality is as much 
energy, process, flow, and intensity as entity and extension. Barad (2007: 139) 
writes of ‘phenomena’ rather than autonomous parts as the primary ontological 
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unit, where phenomena refers to how humans or objects exist not within 
themselves but as co-constituting intra-action: “Phenomena are the ontological 
inseparability/entanglement of interacting ‘agencies’”. Barad’s account of agency 
resonates with assemblage in that agency becomes a name for the ongoing 
reconfiguring of the world, rather than a property. Particular agential intra-
actions condition phenomena and make certain articulations of assemblage 
meaningful (a theme we will consider more closely later). So, for example, matter 
comes to be understood not as a fixed substance, but as a “substance in its intra-
active becoming – not a thing but a doing, a congealing of [human and 
nonhuman] agency” (Barad, 2007: 151; and see Colls, 2007). But while for Barad 
intra-action insists that distinct agencies do not precede, but rather emerge 
through, their mutual constitution – i.e. agencies don’t exist as individual 
elements – assemblage thinking is more attentive to the autonomy of component 
parts. If in Barad’s conception of phenomena the agency of parts dissipates in the 
focus on phenomena, in assemblage thinking parts retain an importance as 
autonomous actors that may or may not alter the nature of the assemblage. 
Again, assemblage operates not just as a concept that focuses on the co-
constituting nature of different agents within assemblages, but as an ethos 
oriented to the agency of both the parts and the whole.  
Jane Bennett (2010) uses Deleuze’s notion of ‘adsorbsion’ to capture the 
agency of both wholes and parts in assemblage thinking – a gathering of 
elements in way that both forms a coalition and yet preserves something of the 
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agency or impetus of each element. There are two key concerns here for 
assemblage thinking that emerge from the exteriority of relations and differ from 
Barad’s position. First, component parts always exceed their current 
actualisations in an assemblage. Second, parts can be disconnected or plugged 
into a different assemblage in which their interactions are different, and these 
changes in the arrangement and interaction of parts have the potential to 
reconfigure an assemblage as new alliances are forged. This is not to say that an 
agent ever acts alone; agency for Bennett always depends on collaboration: “Each 
member and proto-member of the assemblage has a certain vital force...And 
precisely because each member-actant maintains an energetic pulse slightly ‘off’ 
from that of the assemblage, an assemblage is never a stolid block but an open-
ended collective, a ‘non-totalizable sum’” (ibid. 24). The emergence and 
transformation of assemblage – the first aspect of the agency of assemblage 
highlighted above – is sourced both from new actors entering into the 
assemblage and from previously under-tapped capacities within both 
component parts and wholes (Bennett, 2010; Connolly, 2005).  
Third, and following these two orientations, assemblage thinking refutes 
the reduction of causality to the binary poles of disorder and randomness on the 
one hand and cause-and-effect on the other. Instead it is concerned with how 
specific agential intra-actions articulate assemblages. Rather than attributing 
causality to humans and nonhumans, assemblage focuses on how causality 
emerges through the non-deterministic enactment of practices of world-making. 
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For instance, Li (2007: 285) draws upon Deleuze and Guattari’s reading of 
diffused agency in which material content (e.g. bodies, actions, and passions) 
and enunciations (e.g. statements, plans and laws) are linked not in a linear 
fashion but rhizomatically as reciprocal presuppositions and mutual connections 
play themselves out in the constitution of a social field that is always being 
provisionally ordered: “I emphasize agency – the work that situated individuals 
do – without re-inscribing the self-sovereign subject with a master-mind, a 
master-plan or a singular interest and intention” (ibid: 286).  
Of course, rethinking notions of causality is not new within Geography. 
For instance, there is a connection here with David Harvey’s conception of 
dialectics, if not with the conception of dialectics Deleuze and Guattari seek to 
dispense with in A Thousand Plateaus. As Harvey (2009) has argued, dialectics can 
be seen as a form of thinking through “coevolving ecological moments within 
what Lefebvre would call an ‘ensemble’ or Deleuze an ‘assemblage’ of interactive 
processes” (244). For Harvey, assemblage resonates with Marx’s ‘method of 
moments’ – where ‘moment’ equates to a particular coming together of multiple 
agents – an interplay of socio-ecological processes of place-formation. The 
dialectical approach developed by Harvey requires not reducing any particular 
moment “to a simple refraction of the others”. He suggests that “there is no 
automatic response that sets a predictable (let alone deterministic) pattern of 
interaction between the moments...the evolution is contingent and not 
determined in advance” (ibid. 243, 244). However, while Harvey refutes a 
34 
 
deterministic conception of place, we would argue that assemblage thinking 
extends this by attending more explicitly to non-linear forms of causality which, 
in turn, allows for a detailed account of how orders endure and change 
For example, William Connolly (2005) argues for a conception not of 
‘efficient causality’ but of immanent causality. Connolly’s concern here is with 
how new and unpredictable directions develop when assemblages encounter 
novel perturbations. This means there is always an uncertainty to the agency of 
assemblages, a potential for relations to be otherwise. This is a conception of 
causality that seeks to depart from linearity and to make room for novelty and 
randomness in emergence. Here, randomness – whether in nature, computer 
programs, films, or modes of thinking - may emerge from multiple sources, such 
as the volatility of initial conditions, unexpected changes in external 
environments, or the chance relations that emerge as differential properties of 
existing parts are brought into the assemblage. The focus on immanence and 
nonlinearity rather than efficient or mechanical linearity underlines the work of 
assemblage as more than a theoretical tool, but as an ethos for thinking the 
nature of formation if we begin from the ontological diversity of parts. For 
example, Bennett (2010) describes research on the impact of omega-3 fatty acids 
on different people, from prisoners supposedly made less likely to commit acts 
of violence to school children apparently more like to learn effectively and 
bipolar sufferers seemingly less depressed. In contrast to a ‘mechanical 
causality’, this multiplicity more likely reveals an ‘emergent causality’ whereby 
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particular fats operate in different ways within different bodies, sometimes 
producing unpredictable effects: “This is because a small change in the eater-
eaten complex may issue in a significant disruption of its patterns or function. 
The assemblage in which persons and fats are participants is perhaps better 
figured as a nonlinear system” (Bennett, 2010: 41-42). In a nonlinear system, 
small disturbances can have massive effects, meaning that the agency of small 
components is often only revealed retrospectively in specific traces or as the 
assemblage is later stabilised, and indeed may remain hidden altogether. Bennett 
uses Deleuze and Guattari’s (1988) notion of the ‘operator’ or ‘assemblage 
convertor’ here to highlight the catalytic impact of well-placed elements in either 
transforming assemblages or ensuring relations and parts remain stable.  
In addition, as DeLanda (2006) shows, new actors that enter into the 
assemblage may only effect particular elements of the assemblage, or may affect 
different elements at different points in time and in specific ways. For DeLanda 
(2006: 20) catalysis disrupts linear causality and its premise that the same cause 
always equals the same effect by showing that different causes can lead to ‘one 
and the same effect’ and that “one and the same causes can produce very 
different effects depending on the part of the whole it acts upon”. DeLanda 
(2006: 21) uses the claim “Smoking cigarettes causes lung cancer” to exemplify 
his point: not everyone who smokes cigarettes develops lung cancer, and not all 
victims of lung cancer victims smoked cigarettes at some point in their life. 
Therefore, the cigarettes must be seen as catalysts for cancer (see also Harman, 
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2008). Hormones, to take a different example, may stimulate growth when 
applied to the tip of a plant but inhibit growth when applied to the roots 
(DeLanda, 2006: 20). The creative reworking of relations in motion may render 
causality multiple and indeterminate, meaning that the identification of 
mechanical causality results from ‘cuts’ to the assemblage that reveal only 
specific interactions: causality become visible in shifts between moments of 
unchartered turbulence and the congealment of agencies that appear as traces.  
Assemblage and the stability of form 
 
Rethinking causality and agency relates directly to a paradox at the heart 
of relational thinking: between accounts that emphasise the stability of 
assembled orders and those that emphasise dynamic change. Thinking with 
assemblage enables both sides of this paradox to be held concurrently. As we 
introduced earlier, rather than rely on forms of micro-reductionism – which posit 
dynamic change solely in the agential potential of capable agents – or macro-
reductionism – which tend to figure stability and transformation as a product of 
broader ‘social forces’ – assemblage theory emphasises both the emergent nature 
of composition and the relative autonomy of an assemblage’s component parts. It 
therefore offers a novel response to the enduring problem of how to think 
through processes of change and dynamism within relational thinking. In this 
section, we suggest that working with assemblage might be characterised by the 
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emphasis it places on an assemblage’s ‘expressive potential’ (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1988) whilst also accounting for the relative stability of (some) 
assembled orders.    
As we have outlined above, assemblage theory is attentive to the practices 
and processes of formation that enable the composition of assembled orders 
whilst maintaining a sensitivity to the diversity of assemblage forms; a tree 
assemblage, a school assemblage, a genetic assemblage etc. Assemblage theory 
might therefore be read as a way of navigating two major theoretical issues 
concerning the stability of form and the processes of assemblage formation. On 
the one hand, assemblage thinking is inspired by an implicit critique of 
(neo)functionalism, evident in a range of contemporary social theoretical 
positions, of both structuralist and poststructuralist persuasion (Alexander, 
1998). As we have outlined above, assemblage thinking insists on the exteriority 
of relations, standing against a conception of mute functionality of parts, as 
determined by their functional position in a greater organic wholes. On the other 
hand, assemblage theory might be read as an attempt to think variation in form 
without relying on a conception of essential difference. Here assemblage theory 
maintains an account of the differences between, for example a tree-assemblage 
and a school assemblage, without an account that relies on an essential tree-ness 
or school-ness as the mark of distinction. Rather in assemblage thinking 
difference is produced precisely by the autonomous capacities – rather than 
properties – of an assemblage’s component parts coupled with the doctrine of 
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‘emergent causality’ we highlighted above. Rather than produce an essentialist 
account of the internal characteristics or make-up of this or that assemblage, 
assemblage thinking insists that that range of causal factors might have 
produced similar emergent forms, and in different conditions the same 
constituent parts might have produced different assemblages.  
As we have suggested throughout this paper assemblage thinking might 
be understood as a properly post-relational ontology, particularly in its 
insistence on the autonomy of parts and the exteriority of relations. At its most 
vague relational theories have tended to invoke a conception of universal 
potentiality, as a way of accounting for both stability in form and the potential 
for dynamic change. Actor network theorisation have adopted a more detailed 
and subtle conceptual vocabulary for this problematic, emphasising the kinds of 
work required to maintain the stability of network relations (Law and Callon, 
1992) and an account of the performative potential for such work to exceed their 
relational framing, producing overflows and externalities (Strathern, 2002). 
Assemblage theory takes an alternative approach to resolving this problem; one 
that is particularly adverse to notions of universal potentiality. This solution is, at 
the very least, radically particularist, attending to the singularity of compositions 
that are formed through the particular, but non-essential, capacities of 
component parts.  
The particularist orientation of assemblage thinking is most obvious in 
DeLanda’s (2006; 2011) recent development of an ‘assemblage theory’. DeLanda’s 
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ontology is characterised by a sustained discussion of the nature of form and 
form giving, the stability and durability of assemblages and what he terms the 
‘space of possibility’, which concerns the relative tendencies of assemblages for 
spatial and temporal variation. For DeLanda assemblages are real and historic 
entities and individual assemblages are distinct from each other. The solution 
that he provides to the problem of the stability of assembled forms; one that 
insists on the singularity of assemblages, that assemblages are more than simply 
aggregates of their component parts, without implying a sense of essential 
characteristics or ontic fixity, is indicative of a emergence post-relational 
ontology evident in contemporary social theory more broadly (Bryant, et al., 
2011).  
Working with notions of emergent causality and a concept of agency 
located in the interactive processes of composition DeLanda characterises 
assemblages in three principle ways. Primary for DeLanda is their reality; 
assemblages are real entities in a world comprised of other real entities. By real, 
DeLanda also means that assemblages are geographically and historically 
contingent. An assemblage “is not defined by essential traits but rather by the 
morphogenetic process that gave rise to it” (DeLanda, 2002: 10). Assemblages are 
historic productions, but this history does not function in a determinative 
fashion. Rather assemblages are “born at a particular time, live a life, and then 
die. It follows that knowledge of an assemblage does not derive from a 
“botanical” classification that takes properties for granted but from an account of 
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the origin and endurance of those properties. … Every actual assemblage is an 
individual singularity” (DeLanda, 2011: 185).  
This historic singularity is suggestive of the second characteristic of 
assemblages in DeLanda’s ontology; that their identity is formed through the 
autonomous capacities of their component parts. As we introduced above, 
DeLanda makes a primary distinction between the properties and capacities of 
these parts. This distinction enables DeLanda to insist that assemblages are at 
once real, stabilised, and historic entities, whilst at the same time attending to the 
implicit tendencies of assembled orders for internal variation, change and 
dynamism. DeLanda’s insistence on a notion of morphogenesis as the historic 
process that provides an emergent form to assemblages “gets rid of all 
transcendent factors using exclusively form-generating resources which are 
immanent to the material world” (2002: 10). The form of assemblages is not 
determined by some external social, biological or physical force, but is rather 
contingently determined by the capacities of the parts that make up an 
assemblage. By explicitly avoiding a notion of co-functionality – that parts are 
simply defined by their position and role in forming a great whole – the form of 
assemblages is therefore both immanent to this historic process and contingent 
upon its persistence and endurance. As such, “one and the same assemblage can 
have components working to stabilize its identity as well as components forcing 
it to change or even transforming it into a different assemblage. In fact one and 
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the same component may participate in both processes by exercising different 
sets of capacities” (2006: 12).  
Based on this distinction DeLanda outlines a third characteristic feature of 
assemblages; that the stability of assemblages is neither absolute nor pure 
potentiality. Rather for DeLanda the form of assemblages subsist as a “structure 
of a possibility space”, a figure that expresses the multitude of possible, though 
not necessarily actualised, capacities of an assemblage’s component parts. 
Summarising his ontology DeLanda defines assemblages in the following way: 
 
Every assemblage must be treated as a unique historical entity 
characterised by a set of actual properties (making it an individual 
singularity) as well as by the structure of possibility spaces defining its 
tendencies and capacities (a structure defined by universal singularities). 
(2011: 188).  
 
Whilst DeLanda’s strictly realist image of assemblages is not shared by all 
proponents of assemblage thinking, his methodology for resolving the paradox, 
inherent in relational thinking, between stability of form and dynamic change is 
indicative of a wider orientation evident in assemblage thinking. Given his 
understanding of assemblages as historic and contingent singularities, DeLanda 
suggests that characterising the space of possibility is purely an empirical matter. 
Though it would never be possible to fully characterise the multitude of possible 
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capacities inherent in the formation of assemblages, DeLanda suggests that 
“some possibility spaces are continuous having a well-defined spatial structure 
that can be investigated mathematically” while others are “discrete, possessing 
no inherent spatial order but being nevertheless capable of being studied though 
the imposition of a certain arrangement” (2011: 5). So whilst assemblages are 
internally dynamic, a dynamism produced by the emergent capacities of an 
assemblage’s component parts, DeLanda does not invoke a universal rule of 
dynamic change and strictly avoids an account of such possibility as subsisting 
solely as potentiality. Rather rates of change and relative degrees of stability are 
an empirical matter, dependent on the singularity of such capacities.  
DeLanda’s solution to the problematic of stability in form is heavily 
indebted to Deleuze and Guattari’s own characterisation of assemblage. Though 
posed in different terms, Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of assemblage, is 
marked by a similar conceptual move to DeLanda. In developing a concept of 
assemblage Deleuze and Guattari’s strive to avoid a universal model of dynamic 
change and equally steer clear of a vague model of universal potentiality. Their 
conception of assemblage is characterised instead by a notion of expression, 
which parallels DeLanda’s notion of capacity. For example, they suggest: 
 
Assemblages are defined simultaneously by matters of expression that 
take on consistency independently from the form substance-relation; 
reverse causalities or ‘advanced’ determinisms, decoded innate 
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functions related to acts of discernment or election rather than linked to 
reactions; and molecular combinations that proceed by nonconvalent 
bonding rather than by linear relations.  
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 337) 
 
Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of expression is therefore a critique of two major 
currents in contemporary theories of representation and communication; theories 
of representation where expression is defined by its content and where ‘content 
is viewed as having an objective existence prior and exterior to the form of its 
expression’ (Massumi, 2002a: xiv) and the alternative premise that content is 
defined by form, where communicative expression is a manifestation of extra-
linguistic social forms. Though Deleuze and Guattari see that expression is 
external to language, this exteriority is not simply a matter of unseen social 
factors. Rather the exteriority of relations between expression and the content of 
expressions is maintained by the performative quality of expression itself, 
whereby “every utterance is an “order-word” in the sense that it moulds, subtly 
or directly, the potential actions of its addressees” (Massumi, 2002a: viii).  
In order to illustrate this point Deleuze and Guattari (1988) gloss 
Foucault’s (1975) well-know analysis of the prison. They suggest that Foucault’s 
discursive analysis points to the proliferation of the ‘prison-form’, which is 
reciprocally tied to ‘delinquency’ as a form of expression, “a new way of 
classifying, stating, translating, and even committing criminal acts” (Deleuze and 
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Guttari, 1988: 66). Here we have an example of how different agents act through 
particular interactions, and how the assemblages that surround punishment 
come to be defined by particular expressions of power. Though the prison-form 
appears as a complex assemblage of power the expression of delinquency “has 
an autonomous content all of its own” (ibid. 67). In DeLanda’s terms delinquency 
might be read as a capacity and as such the prison-form has a contingent and 
expressive tendency to transform into and merge with other social institutions – 
the school, the clinic and the factory (see also Massumi, 2002a). In different 
historical circumstances the prison form, and most particularly delinquency, has 
a morphogenetic capacity to be joined up with other social and political 
dynamics to form different and alterative assemblages. It is in this sense that the 
notion of assemblage for Deleuze and Guattari implies a conception of the 
expressive capacity of assembled orders as an index of their durability, stability 
and capacity for morphological change.  
Conclusion 
 
In geography, we have witnessed not so much a ‘relational turn’ as a 
mainstreaming of relationality as a point of departure for geographical research 
and debate (e.g. see, to highlight just a few instances, the different interventions 
of and debates around Jessop, Brenner and Jones, 2008; Massey, 2005; Marsten, 
Jones and Woodward, 2007). The proliferation of the notion of assemblage 
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emerges in this broader context. Its promise lies in attending to how entities that 
differ in nature and kind from one another intra-act through relations of 
exteriority. As such, assemblage theory demarks a key difference to the broader - 
and vaguer - claims that finite, contingent, entities are ‘relationally constituted’. 
We have argued that assemblage thinking offers four things to contemporary 
social-spatial theory; an experimental realism orientated to processes of 
composition; a theorisation of world of relations and that which exceeds a present 
set of relations which involves focusing on the capacities of both interactions and 
component parts; a rethinking of agency in distributed terms and causality in 
non-linear, immanent, terms; and an orientation to the expressive capacity of 
assembled orders as a way of describing how they remain stable and change.  
In closing, we want to consider some of the potential questions for ethics 
and politics that follow from this characterisation of assemblage thinking.  
First, the realism of assemblage theory has implications for questions of 
responsibility and ethics, where the starting point is to disrupt a metaphysics of 
the individual as foundational to ethics. Reading causality as an emergent 
property of intra-action shifts questions of responsibility from a position of 
exteriority to the world to a context of radical reciprocity. What Barad (2007: 392, 
296) calls an ‘ethics of worlding’ opens multiple spacetimes of intervention 
within assemblages, where the imperative to act responsibly is one of “meeting 
each moment, being alive to the possibilities of becoming’, an ‘ethical call, an 
invitation that is written into the very matter of being and becoming”. Or, as 
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Bennett (2010: 37) puts it: “Perhaps the ethical responsibility of an individual 
human now resides in one’s response to the assemblages in which one finds 
oneself participating”. The difficulty here lies in a potential tension between a 
materialist ontology that emphasizes the distribution of agency and 
responsibility, and a tendency to centre the human, or groups of humans, as the 
basis or arbiter of causation and responsibility and therefore the referent object of 
ethical judgement. This tension is in part a product of our methodological 
choices – in centering out research objectives around particular actors, we are 
already producing a particular kind of agency while marginalising others. But 
there is more to this. We may, for example, choose to act strategically in our 
decision to attribute responsibility as part of a politics of critique.  This entails 
purposively enacting what Barad calls ‘agentic cuts’ within assemblages. For 
example, Bennett (2010: 38) contends: “It is ultimately a matter of political 
judgment what is more needed today: should we acknowledge the distributed 
quality of agency in order to address the power of human-nonhuman 
assemblages and to resist a politics of blame? Or should we persist with a 
strategic understatement of material agency in the hope of enhancing the 
accountability of specific humans?” Perhaps Bennett oversimplifies the choices 
here, but what she usefully adds is the possibility that our ethical or political 
obligations might demand that we cut and specify causality within assemblages 
in order to attribute responsibility and blame. In other words, we might 
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strategically choose who or what to hold to account as an ethical or political 
stance.  
Following on, the second issue is one that is only just being examined 
through assemblage in geography, and pertains to assemblage’s politics. In 
raising this we are not suggesting that assemblage has or should have any 
particular politics.  Instead we want to consider what ramifications there might 
be for thinking politically when we start with an understanding of the social that 
is figured in the terms of assemblage. In common with other forms of relational 
thought, the politics of assemblage begins from a claim that orders are contingent 
achievements that require ongoing work. At its most simple a politics of 
assemblage maps how powerful assemblages form and endure, thus loosening 
the deadening grip abstract categories hold over our sense of political possibility. 
But can this now fairly well known starting point be translated into a positive 
decree? Certainly, assemblage has a differential political history in this respect, 
whether in the shape of the compositionalism of the autonomist Marxists 
(Berardi, 2008), in Hardt and Negri’s (2004) conception of the ‘multitude’ and 
their more open-ended and explicitly biopolitical rendering of the ‘commons’ 
and ‘revolutionary assemblages’ in Commonwealth (2009; and see Negri, 2006), or 
indeed in what Tampio (2009) calls, after Deleuze, ‘left assemblages’ and what 
Ruddick (2010) calls ‘emancipatory assemblages’. There are, of course, 
differences in how assemblage thinking emerges here, but in each case 
assemblage names an orientation to the possibility of politics. For Hardt and 
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Negri (2004), the multitude emerges broadly through a proletarian revolution 
acting as a Leninist agent, while in Commonwealth (2009) their focus is more on 
possibility of building institutions that harness the horizontal and affective life of 
capitalist biopower in the assembling of multiple voices, knowledge and modes 
of living. ‘Left assemblages’ extends this latter conception by focussing on the 
experimentation with difference as a means for actualising ideals like freedom 
and equality (Tampio, 2009). In these different accounts, assemblage operates as 
a potential for political unity through difference, where the agents that produce 
that unity have long been the subject of controversy on the left, from the agent of 
working class consciousness to the post-capitalist rendering of infinite 
multiplicity. For us, the key questions would be: How does assemblage thinking 
denote the possible in politics? What kinds of politics might that privilege and 
exclude? And how to these positive experiments in the politics of assemblage 





Allen, J. and Cochrane, A. 2010: Assemblages of state power: Topological shifts 
in the organization of government and politics. Antipode, 42(5), 1071-1089. 
Allen, J. 2003: Lost Geographies of Power. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Alexander, J. C. 1998: Neofunctionalism and After. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Anderson, B., and Wylie, J. 2009: On geography and materiality. Environment and 
Planning A 41(2): 318 – 35. 
Anderson, B., and Harrison, P. 2010: The promise of non-representational theory. 
In: A Anderson and P Harrison (eds.) Taking-Place: Non-Representational 
Theory and Human Geography London: Ashgate, pp 1-34.  
Anderson, B., and McFarlane, C. 2011 Special Issue: Assemblage and Geography. 
Area. 43(2).  
Barad, K. 2007: Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the 
Entanglement of Matter and Meaning. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 
Bennett, J. 2004: The force of things: steps towards an ecology of matter. Political 
Theory 32(3): 347-72. 
Bennett, J. 2005: The agency of assemblages and the North American blackout. 
Public Culture 17(3): 445-65. 




Berardi, F. 2008: Félix Guattari: Thought, Friendship and Visionary Cartography. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Bryant, L., Srnicek, N., and Harman, G., eds. 2011: The Speculative Turn: 
Continental Materialism and Realism. Prahan: Melbourne: Re.Press. 
Callon, M., and Caliskan, K. 2005: New and old directions in the anthropology of 
markets. Paper prepared for New and Old Directions in the Anthropology 
of Markets, symposium sponsored by the Wenner-Gren Foundation, New 
York.  
Colls, R. 2007: Materialising bodily matter: intra-action and the embodiment of 
‘fat’’. Geoforum 38: 353-65. 
Connolly, W. E. 2005: Pluralism. Durham, N.C: Duke University Press. 
Cowan, D. and Smith, N, 2009: After geopolitics? From the geopolitical social to 
geoeconomics. Antipode, 41:1, 22-48. 
DeLanda, M. 2002: Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy. London: Continuum. 
DeLanda, M. 2006: A New Philosophy of Society: Assemblage Theory and Social 
Complexity. New York: Continuum. 
DeLanda, M. 2010: Deleuze: History and Science. New York, Dresden: Atropos 
Press. 
DeLanda, M. 2011: Philosophy and Simulation: The Emergence of Synthetic Reason. 
New York: Continuum. 
Deleuze, G., and Guattari, F. 1988: A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia. London: The Athlone Press. 
51 
 
Deleuze, G., and Parnet, C. 1977: Dialogues. New York: Columbia University 
Press. 
Foucault, M. 1975: Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. London: Penguin 
Books. 
Gidwani, V. 2008: Capital, Interrupted: Agrarian Development and the Politics of work 
in India. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Hardt, M. and Negri, A. 2004: Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Hardt, M. and Negri, A. 2009: Commonwealth. Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press.  
Harman, G. 2008: DeLanda's ontology: asseblage and realism. Continental 
Philosophy Review 41: 367-83. 
Harrison, P. 2007: How shalt I say it … ? Relating the nonrelational. Environment 
and Planning D: Society and Space. 39(3): 590-608.   
Harvey, D. 2009: Cosmopolitanism and the Geographies of Freedom. New York: 
Columbia University Press. 
Hetherington, K., and Law, J. 2000: After networks. Environment and Planning D: 
Society and Space 18: 127-32. 
Hinchliffe, S. 2007: Geographies of Nature: Societies, Environments, Ecologies. 
London, Sage.  
Jessop, B., Brenner, N., and Jones, M. 2008: Theorizing sociospatial relations. 
Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 28: 389-401. 
52 
 
Kearnes, M. B. 2003: Geographies that matter – the rhetorical deployment of 
physicality? Social & Cultural Geography 4(2): 139-52. 
Latham, A., and McCormack, D. P. 2004: Moving cities: rethinking the 
materialities of urban geographies. Progress in Human Geography 28(6): 701-
24. 
Latour, B. 2005: Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory. 
Oxford: Clarendon. 
Law, J. 2004: After Method: Mess in Social Science Research. London: Routledge. 
Law, J. 2007: Actor network theory and material semiotics,  unpublished draft 
paper, available at http://www.heterogeneities.net/publications/Law-
ANTandMaterialSemiotics.pdf, (downloaded on 12h June, 2008). 
Law, J., and Callon, J. 1992: The life and death of an aircraft: a network analysis 
of technical change. In  W. E Bijker and J Law (eds.) Shaping Technology, 
Building Society: Studies in Sociotechnical Change. Cambridge, M.A.: The 
MIT Press, pp. 21-52. 
Lee, N., and Brown, S. 1994: Otherness and the actor network. American 
Behavioural Scientist 37(6): 772-90. 
Li, T. M. 2007: Practices of assemblage and community forest management. 
Economy and Society 36(2): 263-93. 
Luhmann, N. 1995: Social Systems. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 




Marston, S., Jones, J.P, and Woodward, K. 2007: Human Geography without 
Scale. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers.  30, 416-32. 
Massey, D. (2005) For Space. Sage: London. 
Massumi, B. 1988: Translator's foreword: Pleasures of philosophy. In Deleuze, G., 
and Guattari, F. 1988: A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. 
London: The Athlone Press, ix-xvii. 
Massumi, B. 2002a: Introduction: like a thought. In  B Massumi (ed.) A Shock to 
Thought: Expression After Deleuze and Guattari. London: Routledge, pp. xiii-
xxxix. 
Massumi, B. 2002b: Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation. Durham, 
N. C.: Duke University Press. 
Maturana, H. R., and Varela, F. J. 1972: Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realisation of 
the Living. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing. 
McCann, E., and Ward, K. (eds). 2011: Mobile Urbanism: City Policymaking in the 
Global Age. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 
McFarlane, C. 2009: Translocal assemblages: space, power and social movements. 
Geoforum 40: 561-67. 
McFarlane, C. 2011: The city as assemblage: dwelling and urban space. 
Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 29(4): 649-671. 
McGuirk, P. M., and Dowling, R. 2009: Neoliberal privatisation? Remapping the 
public and the private in Sydney’s masterplanned residential estates. 
Political Geography 28(3): 174–85. 
54 
 
Negri, A. 2006: The Porcelain Workshop: For a New Grammar of Politics. Los 
Angeles: Semiotext(e). 
Ong, A. 2007: Neoliberalism as a mobile technology. Transactions of the Institute of 
British Geographers 32(1): 3-8. 
Oyama, S. 2000: The Ontogeny of Information: Developmental Systems and Evolution. 
Durham, N. C. : Duke University Press. 
Phillips, J. 2006: Agencement/Assemblage. Theory, Culture & Society 23(2-3): 108. 
Riles, A. 2001: The Network Inside Out. Michigan: The University of Michigan. 
Robbins, P. and B. Marks, 2009. Assemblage geographies. In S.J. Smith, R. Pain, 
J.P. Jones III, & S.A. Marston, eds. The Sage Handbook of Social Geographies, 
Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 176-194. 
Ruddick, S. 2010: The politics of affect: Spinoza in the work of Negri and 
Deleuze. Theory, Culture & Society 27(4): 21-45. 
Saldanha, A. 2006: Reontologising race: the machinic geography of phenotype. 
Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 24: 9-24. 
Saldanha, A. 2007: Psychedelic White: Goa Trance and the Viscosity of Race. 
Minneapolis University of Minnesota Press. 
Sassen, S. 2006: Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages. 
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
Shaviro, S. 2010: Post-Cinematic Affect. Hants: Zero Books  
Stengers, I. 2008: A Constructivist Reading of Process and Reality. Theory, Culture 
& Society 25(4): 91-110. 
55 
 
Strathern, M. 2002: Externalities in comparative guise. Economy and Society 31(2): 
250-67. 
Strathern, M. 2004: Partial Connections. Walnut Creek, C.A.: Alta Mira Press. 
Swanton, D. 2008: The Force of Race. In C. Dwyer and C. Bressey, eds. New 
Geographies of Race and Racism in the British Isles, London: Ashgate, 239-254. 
Swanton, D. 2010: Flesh, metal, road: tracing the machinic geographies of race. 
Environment and Planning D:  Society and Space 28(3) 447 – 466. 
Tampio, N. 2009: Assemblages and the Multitude: Deleuze, Hardt, Negri, and 
the Postmodern Left. European Journal of Political Theory, 8: 383-400 
Venn, C. 2006: A Note on Assemblage. Theory, Culture & Society 23(2-3): 107. 
Wright, S. 2002: Storming Heaven Class Composition and Struggle in Italian 
Autonomist Marxism. London: Pluto Press. 
Wright, S. 2008: Mapping pathways within Italian Autonomist Marxism: a 
preliminary survey. Historical Materialism 16: 111-40. 
 
 
